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Abstract. The engineering challenges involved in building large scale
quantum computers, and the associated infrastructure requirements, mean
that when such devices become available it is likely that this will be in
limited numbers and in limited geographic locations. It is likely that
many users will need to rely on remote access to delegate their com-
putation to the available hardware. In such a scenario, the privacy and
reliability of the delegated computations are important concerns. On the
other hand, the distributed nature of modern computations has led to
a widespread class of applications in which a group of parties attempt
to perform a joint task over their inputs, e.g., in cloud computing. In
this paper, we study the multi-client delegated quantum computation
problem where we consider the global computation be made up of local
computations that are individually decided by the clients. Each client
part is kept secret from the server and the other clients. We construct a
composable secure multi-client delegated quantum computation scheme
from any composable secure single-client delegated quantum computa-
tion protocol and quantum authentication codes.
1 Introduction
The distributed nature of modern computations has led to a widespread class of
applications in which a group of parties perform a joint task over their inputs.
In these situations, it is very often desirable that the parties’ privacy should
be preserved due to the fact that they may be mutually distrustful. This has
stimulated extensive research in classical cryptography, in the form of secure
multi-party computation (MPC) [54,23,46]. The aim of MPC is to guarantee
that the joint public task is carried out correctly and that the parties will not
obtain any information from their interactions other than the final output of
the computation and what is naturally leaked from it. Some applications of
MPC include secure decentralized elections, secure auctions and private data
mining. Private function evaluation [37,36,4,12] (PFE), is a special case of MPC,
where the parties compute a function which is determined privately by one of
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the parties. The key additional security requirement is that the only permitted
leakage to an adversary about the function is the size of the circuit evaluating
it.
There has also been work on quantum extensions of MPC, namely secure
multi-party quantum computation (MPQC) [14,8], based on verifiable quantum
secret sharing. In [18], the problem of privately evaluating some unitary trans-
formation against the quantum version of classical semihonest adversaries over
a joint input state held by two parties was addressed. This study was later made
secure against more malicious adversaries in [19].
In the schemes mentioned above, all parties are assumed to have quantum
computational power. However, as realising scalable and reliable quantum com-
puters is an important challenge, when they can be built, it is likely that there
will be a limited number of them available. In this case, clients with restricted
quantum capabilities may need to securely delegate their computations to a uni-
versal quantum server, in the sense that their inputs, computation and outputs
remain hidden from the server. This is known as blind quantum computation
(BQC).
BQC was first considered by Childs [13] using the idea of encrypting the input
qubits with a quantum one-time pad [1]. A subsequent research in this field was
presented in [3], which was equipped with the possibility of detecting a malicious
server. However, these approaches required complex quantum capabilities on the
client’s side. The complexity of the client’s device was reduced in [10] to preparing
a certain set of single qubit states, and a universal blind quantum computing
(UBQC) protocol was presented. This was the first protocol to take advantage
of the measurement-based quantum computation model (MBQC) [50] for BQC.
A different approach for utilising MBQC for UBQC was proposed in [43] where
the client only makes measurements instead of state preparation. The security of
this protocol is based on the no-signaling principle [47]. In recent years, various
aspects of BQC have been studied [51,38,41,30,39,17,43,16,31,22,32,44,42,42],
and a number of schemes have been successfully implemented in experiment
[7,6,24,27].
A deeply coupled property with any BQC is verifiability, which is the ability
of the client to verify the correctness of delegated quantum computation (DQC).
The verification mechanism allows clients to either confirm that the server has
followed the instructions of the protocol, or detect if it has deviated from the
protocol. There are basically two main approaches for the verification of BQC in
the literature, namely trapped-based and stabilizer testing. The former approach
typified by [20] uses hidden traps in the resource state that do not affect the com-
putation. Following that, trap-based techniques have been utilised in [39,21,25].
The second approach [43] only requires the server to generate many-qubit states.
Thus, the client only has to verify those states and this goal can be achieved
by directly verifying the stabilizers of the states, which is called stabilizer test-
ing [26,40].
However, in the results described above, the security definition under which
security of the protocols has been considered was in a stand-alone setting, where
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the protocol is studied in isolation from the environment. For instance, in [10] a
protocol is said to be blind if the distribution of the classical and the quantum
information obtained by the server is fully determined by the permitted leakage.
The permitted leakage is what the server can unavoidably learn from the inter-
actions with the client. Most of the BQC protocols proposed so far have used
some form of this definition. However, the stand-alone definition of blindness
does not provide any guarantee on the behaviour of the protocol when it is used
as a subroutine in a larger system. A stronger form of cryptographic security
is composable security [11,45,34] which certifies the security of a protocol when
run together with many other protocols, even if they are insecure. Specifically,
composable security definitions for DQC were introduced in [15]. It has been
shown that the UBQC protocols in [20] and [43] satisfy these definitions.
The problem of secure delegation of a multi-party quantum computation to a
server having a universal quantum computer is addressed in [29]. In this setting, a
number of computationally weak clients (possibly mistrustful) intend to perform
a global unitary operation, known to all of them a priori, on their joint input state
with the help of a powerful untrusted server. In this approach, the private data
of the clients remain secret during the protocol and the computation performed
is not known to the server. The security of the protocol against a dishonest
server and against dishonest clients, under the asumption of common classical
cryptographic constructions, is proved.
In this paper, we examine the multi-client DQC problem from a different per-
spective. In our setting, we let the global unitary be made up of local unitaries
that are individually decided by the clients. All local unitaries of each client are
kept secret from the server and the other clients. We construct a composable
secure multi-client DQC scheme from any composable secure single-client DQC
and quantum authentication codes. Our scheme finds application in, e.g., dis-
tributed cloud computing [2], in which clients from multiple geographic locations
process their data on a server to perform a global computation.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, the needed preliminar-
ies are provided. In Section 3, the proposed protocol for multi-client DQC and
the proof of security is presented. The optimisation of the protocol is provided
in Section 4 by reducing the quantum communication between the clients and
the server. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Composable Security
Local security definitions consider cryptographic protocol problems in a model
where the only involved parties are the actual participants in the protocol, and
only a single execution of the protocol happens. However, this model of stand-
alone execution does not fully capture the security requirements of a crypto-
graphic protocol which is embedded in a larger scheme and is run concurrently
with a number of other protocols. For a cryptographic protocol to be usable in
a larger context, the security definitions need to be composable.
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A strong and desirable security definition is given by composable security,
using three approaches: the universal composability (UC) framework [11], reac-
tive simulatability (RS) [45] and the abstract cryptography (AC) developed by
Maurer and Renner [34]. These security definitions have also been extended to
the quantum setting [9,53,49].
In contrast to UC and RS, AC uses a top-down paradigm which first consid-
ers a higher level of abstraction, provides definitions and theorems at this level
and then proceeds downwards, introducing in each new lower level only the ab-
solutely essential specializations. The fundamental element of AC is a system, an
abstract object with interfaces through which it interacts with the environment
and/or other systems. Systems are composed of three classes, namely resources,
converters, and distinguishers. A resource is a system with a set of interfaces.
Generally, each interface is devoted to one party, representing the functionalities
that are accessible to that party. Converters are used to transform one resource
into another and capture operations that a player might perform locally at their
interface. These are systems with only two interfaces, one is designed as an in-
side interface and the other one as an outside interface. The inside interface is
connected to the resources and the outside interface receives inputs and pro-
duces outputs. We write either piiR or Rpii to describe the new resource with
the converter pii connected at the interface i.
A set of converters which describe how available resources are combined to
realise another resource is called a protocol. Another type of converter that we
need is a filter. For a cryptographic protocol to be useful, it is not sufficient
to provide guarantees on what happens when an adversary is present, one also
has to provide a guarantee on what happens when no adversary is present. We
model this setting by covering the adversarial interface with a filter that emulates
honest behaviour.
The closeness of two resources is defined by a pseudo-metric d(·, ·) on the
space of resources which is captured by a distinguisher. It is a system which
having access to all interfaces of one of the two resources, outputs a bit, deciding
which resource it is interacting with. The distinguisher’s advantage is defined
as the difference of probability of the correct output when the distinguisher is
connected to either of resources. Since the distinguishing advantage is a pseudo-
metric, it respects the triangle inequality. For any resources R,S, and T , we
have
d(R,S) ≤ d(R, T ) + d(T ,S). (1)
Distinguishing advantage is non-increasing under composition with any other
system. Therefore for any converter α and resources R,S and T ,
d(αR, αS) ≤ d(R,S), (2)
d(RT ,ST ) ≤ d(R,S). (3)
Two resourcesR and S are considered -close which is denoted byR ≈

S if no
distinguisher (in a certain class of distinguishers) has a distinguishing advantage
of more than .
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AC views cryptography as a resource theory: a protocol constructs a (strong)
resource given some (weak) resources. Due to this constructive aspect of the
framework, it is also called constructive cryptography in the literature [33,35]. If
a protocol pi constructs some resource -close to S from another resource R, we
write:
R pi,−−→ S. (4)
For a cryptographic construction to be usable in any possibly complex man-
ner, the following composable conditions must be held:
R pi,−−→ S and S pi
′,′−−−→ T ⇒ R pi
′pi,+′−−−−−→ T ,
R pi,−−→ S and S pi
′,′−−−→ S ′ ⇒ R||R′ pi|pi
′,+′−−−−−−→ S||S ′,
where R||R′ is the resource resulting from parallel composition of R and R′, and
pi′pi and pi|pi′ are sequential and parallel composition of protocols, respectively.
If two protocols with composable errors  and δ are run jointly (e.g., one is
a subroutine of the other), the error of the composed protocol is bounded by
the sum of the individual errors,  + δ. In Eq. (4), the resource R along with
the protocol pi are parts of the concrete protocol and S is the ideal resource
we want to construct. Eq. (4) holds if the adversary, with access to the ideal
resource, can get anything that she can get in the real world. In other words,
both systems have equivalent behaviour in the sense that they behave identically
if plugged into any possible environment or application. From the adversary’s
point of view, anything that could happen in the real world could identically
happen in the ideal world. Simulator systems transform the ideal resource into
the real world system consisting of the real resource and the protocol. Now we
define the security of a protocol in the three-party setting with honest Alice and
Bob and dishonest Eve. See [34] for the general case.
Definition 1. (Composable security [34]) Let Rφ = (R, φ) and Sψ = (R, ψ) be
pairs of a resource (R and S) with interfaces I = {A,B,E} and filters φ and
ψ. We say that a protocol pi = (piA, piB) securely constructs Sψ out of Rφ within
 and write
Rφ pi,−−→ Sψ, (5)
if the two following conditions hold:
– d(piRφ,Sψ) 6 , and
– there exists a converter σE, called a simulator, such that d(piR,SσE) 6 .
2.2 Delegated Quantum Computation
In a two-party DQC, a client evaluates some (quantum) computation using the
help of a powerful server. The protocol must guarantee blindness, capturing
the idea that the server learns nothing about the input, the output, and the
computation the client evaluated other than what is unavoidable (computation
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size, etc.). The other security concern is verifiability, which indicates that the
client can verify whether the server has followed the instructions or has deviated
from them.
The composable security of DQC using the aforementioned AC framework
was presented in [15]. Having introduced the notions required in the security
definition, the description of the blind verifiable ideal resource model, denoted
by Sbv, is presented as follows:
Definition 2. The ideal DQC resource Sbv which provides correctness, blind-
ness and verifiability, has two interfaces, C and S, standing for the client and
the server respectively. It takes ψc, representing the description of the client’s
computation U and quantum input ρc at the C interface and a filtered controlled
bit fbv at the S interface. If the server sets fbv = 0, Sbv produces the honest
result Uρc at the C interface. If f
bv = 1, the resource outputs the allowed leak-
age `bv at the S interface and some fixed error state |err〉〈err| orthogonal to the
output space at the C interface.
Now we model the structure of a generic two-party DQC protocol, pibv =
(pibvc , pi
bv
s ). The only resource that parties require is a two-way communication
channelR. Client’s protocol pic receives ψc (including the description of ρc and U)
as input on its outside interface. It then communicates with the server’s protocol
pis via R and produces some final output τc. Any such process where client’s
system is denoted C and the server’s system S, is modelled as a sequence of
CPTP maps {Ei : L(HCR) → L(HCR)}Ni=1 and {Fi : L(HRS) → L(HRS)}N−1i=1
which client and the server apply sequentially to their respective systems and
the communication channel R. The protocol pibv = (pibvc , pibvs ) is a map which,
using the channel R, transforms ψc into τc. If both players play honestly and
the protocol is correct this should result in τc = Uρc.
Definition 3. A DQC protocol pibv = (pibvc , pi
bv
s ) constructs a blind verifiable
resource Sbv from the communication channel R within bv if the two following
conditions are satisfied:
pibvc Rpibvs ≈
bv
Sbv ⊥s, (6)
pibvc R ≈
bv
Sbvσbvs , (7)
where ⊥s is a protocol which just sets the filtered bit fbv to zero, and σbvs is some
simulator.
If the first equation is satisfied, the protocol provides bv-composable-correctness
with respect to the ideal resource, Sbv. Correctness captures the notion that the
input-output behaviour of the proposed protocol actually matches the input-
output behaviour of the ideal resource when the server is behaving honestly.
The second condition guarantees both blindness and verifiability and if it is
satisfied we say that we have bv-blind-verifiability. The simulator is a protocol
which, from an outside point of view, makes the ideal protocol look like the real
one, accessing only to the interface of the server. A distinguisher which interacts
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with pibvc R and Sbvσbvs cannot distinguish them within bv. The server’s part of
the protocol pibvs does not appear on the left-hand side of Eq. (7), which indicates
that we no longer specify what the server may do. This signifies that blindness
and verifiability hold for all possible cheating actions of the server. In the rest of
the paper, whenever we refer to BV-DQC(ρ, U), we mean a generic DQC which
satisfies the conditions in Eqs. (6) and (7) where ρ and U are the client’s inputs.
2.3 Quantum Authentication Codes
A quantum authentication scheme (QAS) consists of procedures for encoding
and decoding quantum information which allows for the detection of tampering
on the encoded quantum data with a high probability. Quantum authentication
codes were first introduced by Barnum et al [5]. They also proved that quantum
authentication necessarily encrypts the message as well. It therefore follows that
any authentication protocol for an m-qubit message requires a 2m-bit secret
key k to encrypt the message. The security of quantum authentication codes
is analysed in [48] in the AC framework. It is proved that the authentication
protocols of [5] can construct a secure quantum channel.
Definition 4. The secure quantum channel Cq-sec (which provides both authen-
ticity and confidentiality), shown in the top of Figure 1 (a), allows a quantum
message ρ to be transmitted from Alice to Bob. The resource only allows Eve
to input a filtered control bit fq-sec that decides if Bob receives the message
(fq-sec = 0) or |err〉〈err| (fq-sec = 1). It only leaks `q-sec to the adversary, de-
noted by the dashed arrow in Figure 1 (a), which is a notification that the message
has been sent as well as its length.
The required resources in the concrete setting of QAS are a quantum insecure
channel Cq-insec and a secret key resource K. Cq-insec is completely under the
control of the adversary. It allows the adversary to intercept the message sent
from the sender to the receiver and replace it with any message of their choosing
at their interface. K has three interfaces A, B and E. It outputs a perfectly
uniform secret key k at the interfaces A and B and it has no functionality at the
adversary’s interface E. The QAS protocol which includes the pair of converters
(pieA, pi
d
B) constructs Cq-sec given Cq-insec and K within error q-sec, if the following
equation is satisfied:
pieApi
d
B(K||Cq-insec) ≈
q-sec
Cq-secσq-secE , (8)
where pieA is a converter which receives input state ρ at its outside interface. It
requests a key k from K, applies a map Ek on ρ which outputs an authenticated
state τ and sends it through Cq-insec. pidB takes in a (possibly) tampered state τ ′
and applies a verification map Dk and outputs the state ρ
′. ρ′ is equal to ρ if
the verification succeeds and is equal to |err〉〈err| otherwise (Figure 1 (b)). The
converter σq-secE (shown in Figure 1 (a)) is a simulator that given access only to
the E interface of Cq-sec is able to emulate the behaviour of the adversary so that
the real-world protocol (involving the adversary) is statistically indistinguishable
from the ideal-world protocol (involving the simulator).
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(b)(a)
Fig. 1. a). A schematic of the ideal resource (top) and simulator (bottom) for a
secure quantum channel. Alice, Bob and Eve have access to the left, right and bottom
interfaces of ideal resource Cq-sec, respectively. A simulator σq-secE can be appended to
Eve’s interface so that the interfaces of the compound object matches those of concrete
protocol in (b). b) The QAS protocol (pieA, pi
d
B) constructs Cq-sec given Cq-insec and K.
3 Multi-Client Delegated Quantum Computation
In this section, we present definitions for multi-client DQC. In this scheme,
n clients, Client1,Client2, ..., and Clientn delegate a global computation to an
untrusted powerful server in a blind verifiable manner. Clienti is responsible
for providing their own part of the input state ρi. The global computation is
comprised of a network of local unitaries, individually defined by each client.
The clients’ computations may interlock in the sense that their local unitaries
may affect qubits that are (part of) the outputs of other clients’ local unitaries.
We call these qubits, common qubits. The output of the global computation is
split into n components such that every Clienti receives one part %i. In addition
to security concerns on the server side, the privacy among the clients is required.
Each client learns no information about the input, local unitaries and output
states of the other clients apart from what can be learned by their input, their
local unitary outputs, and the final output state.
The multiple clients may interact in many configurations which are proven
to be universal, such as nearest neighbour topology, where each client interacts
only with their nearest neighbours. However, a desired topology for a multi-
client DQC should be i) a regular arrangement which can hide the structure of
the protocol such that all that is revealed is the total size of unitaries defined by
clients in each round and ii) no dishonest client can become a communication
bottleneck, such that the client can block another client from communicating
with the others. We consider a fully connected topology [52] which fulfils these
requirements. A fully connected network is a communication network in which
each client is connected to all other ones and is represented by a complete graph
in graph theory. A fully connected network is symmetric, in the sense that there
Composable secure multi-client delegated quantum computation 9
is no distinguished node, i.e., every party’s view of the rest of the network is the
same.
Let us define the set of m local unitaries for Clienti as Ui = {U (h)i }h∈{1,...,m},
where U
(h)
i is the h
th local unitary associated with Ci. If the number of local
unitaries of the clients is not the same, then identities are appended to make
them equal. Figure 2 shows an example of such a setting, with n = 3 and m = 2.
The set of labels of qubits of U
(h)
i that are fed into U
(h+1)
j is denoted by T
(h)
i→j .
Now we are ready to define the ideal multi-client DQC resource. In the definition,
ψi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} describes the quantum input ρi, the set of local unitaries Ui
and the sets T
(h)
i→j , where j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and h ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}.
Fig. 2. An example of multi-party computation framework with n = 3 and m = 2
Definition 5. The ideal DQC resource with n clients, Client1, Client2, . . . , Clientn,
which provides correctness, blindness, verifiability and privacy among clients
is denoted by Sn-bv. Sn-bv has n + 1 interfaces, C1, . . . , Cn and S standing
for Client1, . . . , Clientn and the server respectively. It takes ψi at Ci’s inter-
face. The server’s interface has a filter controlled bit fn-bvs . If the server sets
fn-bvs = 0, Sn-bv produces the correct output result of each client at its interface.
If fn-bvs = 1, Sn-bv outputs the allowed leakage `n-bv at the server’s interface and
some fixed error state |err〉〈err| that is orthogonal to the output space, at every
client’s interface (C1, . . . , and Cn) for which an output is expected.
After defining the ideal resource that a generic multi-client DQC protocol
is expected to construct, we mention the resources that are required to achieve
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this, namely, a secret key resource K, a two-way (quantum and classical) channel
Ri between the server and each Clienti, and an authenticated classical channel
Cc-auth between any pair of clients. Cc-auth is a channel which allows a classical
message to be transmitted from the sender to the reciever. We denote all of the
classical authentication channels among clients as Cc-autha .
A protocol pin-bv = (pin-bvc1 , . . . , pi
n-bv
cn , pi
n-bv
s ) constructs a blind verifiable re-
source Sn-bv from (K||Cc-autha ||R1|| . . . ||Rn) within n-bv, if the following condi-
tions are satisfied:
– pin-bvc1 · · ·pin-bvcn pin-bvs (K||Cc-autha ||R1|| . . . ||Rn) ≈
n-bv
Sn-bv ⊥s,
– pin-bvc1 . . . pi
n-bv
cn (K||Cc-autha ||R1|| . . . ||Rn) ≈
n-bv
Sn-bvσn-bvs .
This ensures security against a dishonest server, and is what we shall focus on
proving. A stronger security definition which also captures cheating clients is
obtained by replacing the second criterion above with
– pin-bvch1
· · ·pin-bvchH (K||C
c-auth
a ||R1|| . . . ||Rn) ≈
n-bv
Sn-bvσn-bvD ,
where the simulator σn-bvD acts on the interfaces of all parties except Ch1 , . . . ,
ChH−1 and ChH . A full exploration of protocols for this later model of security
is beyond the scope of the current work.
We build the concrete protocol out of subprotocols that already exist. More
specifically, the subprotocols consist of any BV-DQC and QAS, without making
reference to any particular protocol. Then we use the existing results on the
composable security of BV-DQC and QAS to argue that the composition we
describe is secure. In terms of these subprotocols, the outline of the concrete
setting is as follows. Each client delegates the computation of each local unitary
to the server using BV-DQC. If any client detects a verification error, they
broadcast e = 1 via Cc-autha to all other clients, they all output |err〉〈err| and
abort the protocol. Otherwise, the client sends the common qubits to the server,
and the server sends each qubit to the corresponding clients. The mentioned
channel between the server and the client is insecure because the server might
tamper the qubits and therefore, the client must protect the qubits with quantum
authentication codes.
At the beginning of the protocol, each client agrees on a key for each set of
common qubits with the desired recipient. For the first layer of unitaries, true
computation followed by an authentication map is delegated to the server. In
the intermediate layers, the qubits are first decoded, the true computation is
applied, and finally the qubits are encoded again. As for the last layer of local
unitary, the qubits are first decoded and then the true computation is applied.
All of the aforementioned encoding and decoding maps are carried out by the
agreed corresponding keys and as a part of computation. Similar to the case of
verification error, if any client detects an authentication error between rounds,
they broadcast e = 1 via Cc-autha to other clients, they output |err〉〈err| and abort
the protocol.
A generic protocol for secure multi-client DQC is described in Protocol 1. We
note that in order to be secure against dishonest clients, the protocol would need
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to be ammended so that any client receiving e=1 should immediately rebroadcast
this to all other clients before aborting the protocol to avoid a situation where
a malicious client could cause only a subset of honest clients to abort.
3.1 Security Proof
Theorem 1. Protocol 1 constructs Sn-bv using resources K, R1, R2 and Cc-autha ,
with error n-bv = (mn)bv+n(n−1)(m−1)q-sec, where n and m are the numbers
of clients and each client’s unitaries respectively.
Proof. We will prove the security for a simple example with two clients, Client1
and Client2 each with one local unitary, Uc1 and Uc2 as shown in Figure 3. The
proof can be directly extended for the general case with multiple clients. The
definition of the ideal resource related to the example in Figure 6 is as follows. It
should be noted that for simplicity we will write Uρ instead of UρU† each time
we talk about applying a unitary operation U to a quantum state ρ.
Fig. 3. A sample setting for multi-party computation with two clients, each with one
local unitary.
Definition 6. The ideal 2-client DQC resource related to the example in Fig-
ure 3, S2-bv, which provides correctness, blindness, verifiability and privacy among
clients has 3 interfaces, C1, C2 and S standing for Client1, Client2 and the
server. It takes inputs ρc1 and Uc1 at the C1 interface, and Uc2 at the C2 in-
terface. The server’s interface has a filter controlled bit f2-bvs . If the server sets
f2-bvs = 0, S2-bv outputs %c2 = Uc2Uc1ρc1 at the C2 interface. If f2-bvs = 1, the
server’s interface outputs the allowed leakage and some fixed error state |err〉 〈err|
at the C2 interface.
The top of Figure 4 shows the ideal resource S2-bv. We show that Protocol
2 constructs S2-bv using a parallel composition of K, R1, R2 and Cc-auth, with
error 2-bv = q-sec + 2bv. The proof of security proceeds in three main steps. In
the first step, it is supposed that the parties have access to quantum capabilities,
and hence they do not need the server. In the next step, we move towards the
real setting by assuming that the parties do not have quantum capabilities, but
delegate the computations to an ideal resource without any error. Finally in the
last step, we reach to the real case where the ideal resource may produce error
instead of the correct output.
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Protocol 1 Blind Verifiable Multi-Client DQC
1: Let n and m be the number of clients and the total number of local unitaries of
each client respectively.
2: Let i, j ∈ {1, ..., n}, h ∈ {1, ...,m}, and h′ ∈ {1, ...,m− 1}.
3: Let ρi, Ui = {U (h)i }, and %(m)i be the input, the set of local unitaries and the output
of Clienti, respectively.
4: Let T
(h′)
i→j be the set of labels of output qubits of U
(h′)
i that are fed into U
(h′+1)
j .
5: Let (Ek, Dk) be a pair of keyed operations to be used to authenticate quantum
states.
6: Clienti and Clientj (i 6= j) agree on a secret key k(h
′)
i→j for authenticating the qubits
with labels in T
(h′)
i→j .
7: Let
V
(h)
i =

⊗
j
E
k
(h)
i→j
U
(h)
i , if h = 1,
⊗
j
E
k
(h)
i→j
U
(h)
i ⊗
j
D
k
(h−1)
j→i
, if 1 < h < m,
U
(h)
i ⊗
j
D
k
(h−1)
j→i
, if h = m,
where E
k
(h)
i→j
and D
k
(h)
i→j
are applied to the qubits with labels in T
(h)
i→j .
8: for h′ := 1 to m− 1 do
9: for i := 1 to n do
10: Clienti and the server run BV-DQC(ρ
(h′)
i , V
(h′)
i ) which outputs %
(h′)
i .
11: if %
(h′)
i is |err〉〈err| then
12: Clienti sends e = 1 to the other clients through an authenticated classical
channel and all clients output |err〉〈err| and abort the protocol
13: else
14: Clienti sends %
(h′)
i excluding the qubits with labels in T
(h′)
i→i to the server
15: end if
16: for j := 1 to n, j 6= i do
17: Let %
(h′)
i→j be the state of the qubits of %
(h′)
i in T
(h′)
i→j
18: The server sends %
(h′)
i→j to Clientj
19: end for
20: end for
21: for i := 1 to n do
22: Let ρ
(h′+1)
i = ⊗
j
%
(h′)
j→i.
23: end for
24: end for
25: for i := 1 to n do
26: Clienti and the server run BV-DQC(ρ
(m)
i , V
(m)
i ) which outputs %
(m)
i
27: if %
(m)
i is |err〉〈err| then
28: Clienti sends e = 1 to the other clients through an authenticated classical
channel and all clients output |err〉〈err| and abort the protocol
29: else
30: Clienti outputs %
(m)
i
31: end if
32: end for
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Fig. 4. The top of the figure and the region within the dashed box indicate ideal
resource S2-bv and the simulator σ2-bvs , respectively.
Protocol 2 Blind Verifiable Two-Client DQC for the Setting in Figure 3
1: Let ρci and Uci be the input and local unitary of Ci, respectively, where i ∈ {1, 2}.
2: Client1 and Client2 agree on a secret key k.
3: Let (Ek, Dk) be a pair of operations for authentication.
4: Client1 and the server run BV-DQC(ρc1 , EkUc1) which outputs %
(1)
1 .
5: if %c1 is |err〉〈err| then
6: Client1 sends e = 1 to the other client through an authenticated classical channel
and Client2 outputs |err〉〈err| and aborts the protocol
7: else
8: Client1 sends %
(1)
1 to the server
9: end if
10: The server sends %
(1)
1 to Client2
11: Client2 and the server run BV-DQC(%
(1)
1 , Uc2Dk) which outputs %
′
c2
12: Client2 outputs %
′
c2
1) First we suppose that the parties have access to quantum capabilities
and describe the concrete protocol (shown in Figure 5). In this figure, piu1c1 is
a converter which receives the input state ρc1 , the unitary Uc1 , and produces
Uc1ρc1 . The converter pi
e
c1 receives Uc1ρc1 at its inside interface. It requests a key
k from K. It applies Ek to Uc1ρc1 which outputs an authenticated state τ and
sends it through Cq-insec. The converter pidc2 , takes a (possibly) tampered state τ ′
on the insecure channel and applies verification Dk. It outputs a state ρ
′, which
is equal to Uc1ρc1 or |err〉〈err| depending on whether the verification succeeded
or failed, respectively. The converter piu2c2 receives ρ
′ at its inside interface and
Uc2 at its outside interface and outputs %
′
c2 . If ρ
′ is |err〉〈err|, %′c2 is equal to
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Fig. 5. The concrete protocol for implementing the sample example in Figure 3, where
the parties are supposed to have access to quantum capabilities
|err〉〈err|, otherwise it is Uc2Uc1ρc1 . Using Eq. (8), we have:
piu1c1 pi
u2
c2 pi
e
c1pi
d
c2(K||Cq-insec) ≈q-sec pi
u1
c1 pi
u2
c2 Cq-secσq-secs . (9)
Eq. (9) holds because based on Eq. (2), adding converters piu1c1 and pi
u2
c2 can only
decrease the distance between the two systems. Also we have:
piu1c1 pi
u2
c2 Cq-secσq-secs = S ′σq-secs , (10)
where the ideal resource, S ′ is identical to Cq-sec, except that piu1c1 and piu2c2 have
been merged with it.
2) In Figure 5, the quantum computations performed by the parties are
modelled as converters. We move forward to the real case where the parties do
not have access to quantum capabilities. If they want to delegate this to a server
it should be modelled as a resource. Now we suppose the clients have access to
two resources, SQ1 and SQ2 which perform the quantum part of the computation,
without any error. So we have:
pie
′
c1pi
d′
c2(K||Cq-insec||SQ1 ||SQ2 ) = piu1c1 piu2c2 piec1pidc2(K||Cq-insec), (11)
where pie
′
c1 and pi
d′
c2 are now the classical (or almost classical) converters of Client1
and Client2 that capture their local operations: pi
e′
c1 receives an input state ρc1
and Uc1 at its outer interface, requests a key k and sends ρc1 and EkUc1 to SQ1 .
It receives the response τ and sends it to pid
′
c2 via an insecure channel Cq-insec.
pid
′
c2 receives τ
′ on the insecure channel and Uc2 at its outer interface, requests
the key k from K, sends τ ′ and U2Dk to SQ2 , and receives a response %′c2 , which
it outputs at its outer interface. %′c2 is equal to |err〉〈err| if the state has been
tampered on the Cq-insec, otherwise it is equal to Uc2Uc1ρc1 . Combining Eqs.(9),
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(10) and (11) we get:
pie
′
c1pi
d′
c2(K||Cq-insec||Cc-auth||SQ1 ||SQ2 ) ≈q-sec S
′σq-secs . (12)
3) The problem we have now is that SQ1 and SQ2 are not the ideal resources Sbv
constructed by a BV-DQC protocol, because an error might occur during the
computation. So SQ1 and SQ1 should be modified by giving the server the power
to flip a switch and produce an error instead of the correct outcome. Now we
have Sbv. Also, we need to modify pie′c1 because now Client1 could receive an error
from Sbv1 . So the new converter pie
′′
c1 behaves identically to pi
e′
c1 , except when it
gets an error from Sbv1 , it sends e = 1 to the other client. Also pid
′′
c1 is the same
as pid
′
c1 but when it receives e = 1, it outputs |err〉〈err|.
We also change the ideal resource S′ slightly. S2-bv is identical to S′, the
only difference is that it also leaks `bv1 and `
bv
2 , and whenever there is an error
in computation it outputs |err〉〈err| at the C2 interface. We also have to modify
the simulator σq-secs as follows: σ
q-sec-m
s behaves the same as σ
q-sec
s , but it also
outputs the leak of both computations `bv1 and `
bv
2 , and waits for the server to
anounce if it does the correct computation or not. If so, σq-sec-m tells S2-bv to
output the correct value, otherwise |err〉〈err| at the C2 interface. We now need
to prove that
pie
′′
c1 pi
d′′
c2 (K||Cq-insec||Cc-auth||Sbv1 ||Sbv2 ) ≈q-sec S
2-bvσq-sec-ms . (13)
Eq. (13) follows from Eq. (12), because an optimal strategy for the distinguisher
consists of allowing the correct computation to be performed, which is the case
covered by Eq. (12). If the distinguisher provokes an error, then Client2 will sim-
ply output an error, and the distinguisher has less information available to try
to distinguish the real from the ideal systems. Also revealing the accept/reject
bit does not change the distance because the distinguisher has access to all in-
terfaces, which contain the accept/reject information. Based on Eq. (2) plugging
simulators σbvs on the real and ideal systems cannot increase their distance, so
we have
pie
′′
c1 pi
d′′
c2 (K||Cq-insec||Cc-auth||Sbv1 ||Sbv2 )σbvs σbvs ≈q-sec S
2-bvσq-sec-mσbvs σ
bv
s . (14)
Now we can move the brackets around in the left-hand side of Equation (14),
which could equivalently have been written:
pie
′′
c1 pi
d′′
c2 (K||Cq-insec||Cc-auth||Sbv1 σbvs ||Sbv2 σbvs ) ≈q-sec S
2-bvσq-sec-ms σ
bv
s σ
bv
s . (15)
The final step is to replace Sbv1 σbvs and Sbv2 σbvs by the real BV-DQC protocols.
It is shown in Figure 6. Combining Eqs, (7) and (15) we obtain:
pie
′′
c1 pi
d′′
c2 (K||Cq-insec||Cc-auth||pibvc1R1||pibvc2R2) ≈
q-sec+2bv
S2-bvσq-sec-ms σbvs σbvs .
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Moving brackets around we get:
pie
′′
c1 pi
d′′
c2 pi
bv
c1 pi
bv
c2 (K||Cq-insec||Cc-auth||R1||R2) ≈
q-sec+2bv
S2-bvσq-sec-ms σbvs σbvs .
Figure 6 demonstrates the concrete protocol and resources. Simply put, the com-
position of the authentication protocol and the BV-DQC protocols constructs
the 2-client BV-DQC resource S2-bv with error equal to q-sec + 2bv. The simu-
lator σ2-bvs is equal to σ
q-sec-m
s σ
bv
s σ
bv
s .
Fig. 6. The concrete protocol for implementing the example in Figure 3
The security proof can be directly extended to the case of a generic multi
party DQC. In this case, the total error, n-bv is the sum of the errors of all runs
of BV-DQC and QAS. In the case of fully connected network with n clients and
each with m unitaries, it is equal to:
n-bv = (mn)bv + n(n− 1)(m− 1)q-sec,
where mn is the number of unitaries performed by the server, and n(n−1)(m−1)
is the number of sets of non-common qubits which require quantum authentica-
tion codes to be protected. 
4 Reducing the quantum communications
In this section, we make an additional assumption about BV-DQC scheme which
results in reducing the quantum communication between the clients and the
server. To achieve this goal, first we define the ideal resource Sbb which is used
as a building block in the desirable particular structure of the BV-DQC protocol.
Definition 7. The ideal DQC resource Sbb has two interfaces C and S standing
for the client and the server. It takes U and k′ at the C interface and Ek′ρ at the
S interface, where Ek′ is an authentication map on qubits in ρ. The server also
has a dishonest interface. It takes a filtered controlled bit fbb at the S interface.
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If server sets fbb = 0, Sbb picks a uniformly random key k, outputs k at the C
interface and applies EkUDk′ to Ek′ρ and produces the honest result EkUρ at
the S interfac. If fbb = 1, the resource outputs the allowed leakage `bb at the S
interface and some fixed error state χ = |err〉〈err| orthogonal to the output space
at the C interface.
Now suppose that the BV-DQC protocol pibv is composed of the following con-
verters as Figure 7 shows:
pibv = piecpi
bb
s pi
bb
c pi
d
c , (16)
which means that client’s part of the protocol, pibvc , is decomposed into three
parts; i) piec , ii) pi
bb
c , and iii) pi
d
c as introduced in the following:
i) piec receives ρ and U at its outside interface. It requests a key k
′ and sends
Ek′ρ to the server.
ii) pibbc receives U and k
′ from piec . pi
bb
s receives Ek′ρ on its inside interface. pi
bb
s
and pibbc communicate with each other through R to run the bulk of the
DQC protocol, where piecpi
bb
c pi
bb
s constructs pi
e
cSbb within bb, i.e.,
piecpi
bb
c Rpibbs ≈
bb
piecSbb ⊥s, piecpibbc R ≈
bb
piecSbbσbbs , (17)
therefore we can replace pibbc Rpibbs by Sbb in any context where the client
runs piec . In Eq. (17), we used the idea of context-restricted indifferentiability,
which allows us to model a resource that does not compose generally but
can only be used within a well-specified set of contexts [28]. pibbc passes two
values to pidc ; the key k and a bit which indicates whether any cheating has
been detected so far.
iii) If the server behaves honestly, pidc receives EkUρ from the server, it verifies
the authenticity of this state, and if this test succeeds and pidc did not detect
any cheating either, it outputs the result of the decryption (which should be
Uρ), otherwise it outputs an error.
Protocol 3 is a modified blind verifiable multi-client DQC which removes the
communications between the server and the clients between the rounds. Three
types of protocols, BB1-DQC, BB-DQC, and BB2-DQC which are used in Pro-
tocol 3, are defined as follows:
• BB1-DQC(ρ, U) means piecpibbs pibbc is run which outputs EkUρ and k, if the
verification passes.
• BB-DQC(Ek′ρ, U, k′) means pibbs pibbc is run which outputs EkUρ and k, if the
verification passes.
• BB2-DQC(Ek′ρ, U, k′) means pibbs pibbc pidc is run which outputs Uρ, if the ver-
ification passes.
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Protocol 3 Modified Blind Verifiable Multi-Client DQC (Removing the Com-
munications Between the Clients and the Server)
1: Let n and m be the number of clients and the total number of local unitaries of
each client, respectively.
2: Let i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, h ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and h′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}.
3: Let ρi, Ui = {U (h)i }, and %i be the input, the set of local unitaries and output of
Clienti, respectively.
4: Let T
(h′)
i→j be the set of labels of qubits of U
(h′)
i that are fed into U
(h′+1)
j .
5: Let (Ek, Dk) be a pair of keyed operations using for authenticating quantum states.
6: for i := 1 to n do
7: Clienti and the server run BB1-DQC(ρi, U
(1)
i ).
8: if error is detected then
9: Clienti sends e = 1 to the other clients through an authenticated classical
channel and all clients abort the protocol.
10: else
11: the protocol outputs %
(1)
i = ⊗
j
E
k
(1)
i→j
U
(1)
i ρi and {k(1)i→j}j∈{1,...n}.
12: for j := 1 to n do
13: Clienti sends k
(1)
i→j to Clientj .
14: Let %
(1)
i→j be the state of qubits in T
(1)
i→j .
15: end for
16: end if
17: end for
18: for i := 1 to n do
19: Let ρ
(2)
i = ⊗
j
%
(1)
j→i.
20: end for
21: for h := 2 to m− 1 do
22: for i := 1 to n do
23: Clienti and the server run BB-DQC(ρ
(h)
i , U
(h)
i , {k(h−1)j→i }j∈{1,...n}).
24: if error is detected then
25: Clienti sends e = 1 to the other clients through an authenticated classical
channel and all clients abort the protocol.
26: else
27: the protocol outputs %
(h)
i = (⊗
j
E
k
(h)
i→j
)U
(h)
i (⊗
j
D
k
(h−1)
j→i
)ρ
(h)
i and k
(h)
i→j .
28: for j := 1 to n do
29: Clienti sends k
(h)
i→j to Clientj .
30: Let %
(h)
i→j be the state of qubits in T
(h)
i→j .
31: end for
32: end if
33: end for
34: for i := 1 to n do
35: Let ρ
(h+1)
i = ⊗
j
%
(h)
j→i.
36: end for
37: end for
38: for i := 1 to n do
39: Clienti and the server run BB2-DQC(ρ
(m)
i , U
(m)
i , {k(m)j→i}j∈{1,...n})
40: if error is detected then
41: Clienti sends e = 1 to the other clients through an authenticated classical
channel and all clients abort the protocol.
42: else
43: the protocol outputs %
(m)
i = U
(m)
i (⊗
j
D
k
(m−1)
j→i
)ρ
(m)
i
44: end if
45: end for
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Fig. 7. The converter related to the particular type of BV-DQC protocol which results
in decreased overhead in the multi-client DQC protocol.
4.1 Security Proof
Theorem 2. Protocol 3 constructs Sn-bv using resources K, R1, R2 and Cc-autha ,
with error n-bv = (mn)bb +n(n−1)(m−1)q-sec + 2nq-sec, where n and m are
the numbers of clients and each client’s unitaries respectively.
Proof. Again, we first prove the security for the example in Figure 3 with two
clients. We show that Protocol 4 constructs S2-bv using K, R1, R2 and Cc-auth,
with error 2-bv = 2bb+3q-sec. The proof is easily extended to the general case.
The proof is essentially similar to the proof of the previous section. First, we
suppose the parties have access to the quantum capabilities, but we decompose
the protocol in a slightly different way of the previous section. The protocol is
composed of the following converters:
pie1c1pi
d1
c1 pi
u1
c1 pi
e2
c1pi
d2
c2 pi
u2
c2 pi
e3
c2pi
d3
c2 .
The converter pie1c1 receives ρc1 at its outside interface. It requests a key k1 fromK. It applies the map Ek1 to ρc1 which outputs the state τ1. pid1c1 receives τ ′1
at its outside interface. It receives the key k1 from K and applies Dk1 which
outputs ρc1 or |err〉〈err|, depending on whether verification succeeds or fails.
If verification succeeds, the converter piu1c1 receives Uc1 and ρc1 at its outside
and inside interfaces respectively and outputs Uc1ρc1 . The converter pi
e2
c1 receives
Uc1ρc1 at its inside interface. It requests a key k2 from K and outputs τ =
Ek2Uc1ρc1 through Cq-insec. The converter pid2c2 receives the key k2 from K and
a (possibly) tampered state τ ′ and applies verification map Dk2 . It outputs
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the state Uc1ρc1 if verification succeeded, or |err〉〈err| otherwise. If verification
succeeded, the converter piu2c2 receives Uc1ρc1 at its inside interface and Uc2 at its
outside interface and outputs Uc2Uc1ρc1 . pi
e3
c2 requests a key k3 from K, applies
Ek3 and outputs Ek3Uc2Uc1ρc1 . pi
d3
c2 receives a possibly tampered state and the
key k3 from K. It outputs %c2 = Uc2Uc1ρc1 if verification passes, otherwise it
outputs |err〉〈err|. Based on Eq.(8), we have:
piu1c1 pi
u2
c2 pi
e1
c1pi
d1
c2 pi
e2
c1pi
d2
c2 pi
e3
c1pi
d3
c2 (K||Cq-insec||Cc-auth) ≈3q-sec
piu1c1 pi
u2
c2 Cq-secσq-secs Cq-secσq-secs Cq-secσq-secs .
Now we have:
piu1c1 pi
u2
c2 Cq-secσq-secs Cq-secσq-secs Cq-secσq-secs = S ′σq’-secs σq-secs σq-secs , (18)
where S ′ is the ideal channel where piu1c1 and piu2c2 have been merged with it. σq’-secs
behaves the same as σq-secs , but it also outputs the leak of both communications
`q-sec1 and `
q-sec
2 , and waits to check if the messages have been sent or not. If so,
σq’-sec tells S ′ to output the correct value, otherwise |err〉〈err| at the C2 inter-
face. We move forward to the real case where the parties do not have quantum
capabilities and delegate the computations (except Ek1 and Dk3) to the resource
Sbb. With the similar analyses of the security proof in the previous section, we
have:
pie1c1pi
d3
c2 (K||Cq-insec||Cc-auth||Sbb1 ||Sbb2 ) ≈3q-sec S
2-bvσq”-secs σ
q-sec
s σ
q-sec
s . (19)
The simulator σq”-secs behaves the same as σ
q’-sec
s , but it also outputs the leak
of both computations `bb1 and `
bb
2 and waits for the server to say if it does the
correct computation or not. If so, σq”-sec tells S2-bv to output the correct value,
otherwise |err〉〈err| at the C2 interface. Now, plugging simulators σbb on the real
and ideal systems does not increase their distance:
pie1c1pi
d3
c2 (K||Cq-insec||Cc-auth||Sbb1 σbbs ||Sbb2 σbbs ) ≈3q-sec S
2-bvσq”-secs σ
q-sec
s σ
q-sec
s σ
bb
s σ
bb
s
(20)
The final step is to replace Sbbσbb with the real BB-DQC protocols, pibb =
(pibbc , pi
bb
s ):
pie1c1pi
bb
c1 pi
bb
c2 pi
d3
c2 (K||Cq-insec||Cc-auth||R1||R2) ≈
3q-sec+2bb
S2-bvσq”-secs σq-secs σq-secs σbbs σbbs .
So the composition of the authentication protocol and the BV-DQC protocols
with the particular structure described above, constructs the 2-client BV-DQC
resource, S2-bv with error equal to 2bb + 3q-sec. The security proof can be
directly extended to the case of a generic multi party DQC. In this case the
total error, n-bv is the sum of the errors of all runs of BV-DQC and QAS. In
the case of fully connected network, with n clients and each with m unitaries, it
is equal to:
n-bv = (mn)bb + (n(n− 1)(m− 1) + 2n)q-sec.

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Protocol 4 Modified Blind Verifiable Two-Client DQC for the Setting in Fig-
ure 3
1: Let ρci and Uci be the input and the local unitary. of Ci, respectively, where
i ∈ {1, 2}
2: Let (Ek, Dk) be a pair of operations for authenticating.
3: Client1 and the server run BB1-DQC(ρc1 , Uc1).
4: if error is detected then
5: Client1 sends e = 1 to Client2 through an authenticated classical channel and
both outputs |err〉〈err| and abort the protocol.
6: else
7: the protocol outputs EkU1ρc1 and k.
8: Client1 sends k to Client2.
9: end if
10: Client2 and the server run BB2-DQC(EkU1ρc1 , U2) which outputs %2.
11: if error is detected then
12: Client1 and Client2 output |err〉〈err|
13: else
14: Client2 outputs %c2 = U2U1ρc1 .
15: end if
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the multi-client DQC problem. In our setting, we con-
sidered the global unitary to be made up of local unitaries that are individually
decided by the clients. Each client’s part is kept secret from the server and the
other clients (assuming honest client behaviour). We constructed a verifiable
composable secure multi-client DQC scheme from any verifiable composable se-
cure single-client DQC protocols and quantum authentication codes. We proved
the security and then optimised the protocol by removing the quantum commu-
nication between the clients and the server.
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